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 Abstract 
This thesis studies the relationship between the magnitude of the dowry and the bride’s 
education and income. Dowry is defined the gifts transferred along with the bride from the 
bride’s natal family to the groom’s household at the time of marriage. Gifts are traditionally 
also given from the groom household to the bride, the bride who will belong to the groom 
household after marriage. India has a long tradition of practicing dowry, and is therefore the 
host for this study. Dowry payments have come to be known as the number one reason for 
parents to rather want sons than daughters. The magnitude of the dowry is huge, this thesis 
confirm Rao’s (1993) results that the dowry sometimes amounts to six times the annual 
income of the bridal household, which has negative impact on the savings patterns of the 
household. Data were collected from interviews I conducted in 2013 with households located 
in a rural village in Karnataka, South India. All 96 weddings included were conducted within 
the last five years. OLS-regressions were conducted to discern whether the bride’s education 
and income are significant determinants on the magnitude of the dowry. Three different 
regressions were executed with the net dowry, the gifts from the bridal household and the 
groom household as dependent variables. Several explanatory variables, which capture the 
characteristics of the spouses and their households, were included. Based on the results from 
the regressions we conclude that the income of the bride has significant negative effect on the 
net dowry and gifts given by the bridal household, while her education is insignificant for all 
three equations. The results support Becker’s (1981) theory of marriage payments occurring 
to adjust for the inflexibilities in the division of household commodities.  
 
Key words: Dowry, Female Education, Female Income, Marriage Payments 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 
Dowry is reported as the number one cause for the unwantedness of daughters.  
Srinivas, 2005  
 
Marriage payments are practically extinct in most parts of the world, thus we might easily 
neglect it’s existence. However, in populous India the dowry system continues to be a natural 
part of marriage negotiations, thereby the tradition might affect as much as a fourth of the 
world population. Dowry is defined to the gifts given from the bride’s family to the bride, 
groom or groom’s household, when the bride is transferred in the same direction as the gifts. 
The groom household will traditionally give gifts to the bride, however we need to consider 
the fact that it is ambiguous whether the bride will gain control of the gifts after marriage and 
since the bride will belong to the groom’s household, they are in one way gifting themselves. 
(Botticini et. al, 2003, Dickemann, 1991). The transactions from the bridal household are 
often large and might exceed six times the annual household income, hence the magnitude of 
the dowry has great effect on the economic behaviour of households with daughters, which 
causes parents to not want daughters (Rao, 1993, Srinivas, 1984, Srinivas, 2005). Because of 
this strong affect on women there is an urgent need to study the dowry system and even 
though the dowry is negotiated on the household level, it is my opinion that it has external 
effect on the whole society, thereby it is not only a household problem but a problem of a 
nation.  
 
Anderson (2003, 2007) concludes that dotal societies share a similar structure, such as being 
complex socioeconomic societies, conducting monogamous marriages. India fits perfect in to 
the description and even as India is modernizing marriages are still mainly arranged by the 
spouses’ parents, which is common in dotal societies. Even as the practice of dowry has been 
prohibited since 1961 it remains rigid and Rao (1993) even claim that dowry payments are 
increasing. Andersson (2007) suggests that the caste-system has played an important part in 
preserving and even increasing the practice of dowry. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to discern whether the bridal income and education are 
significant determinants of the magnitude of the dowry. Thus I intend to discern whether a 
woman can negotiate the amount of the dowry through acquiring more education and/or 
income, or if her traits are irrelevant for the value of the transferred gifts. Based on data I 
collected from South India May 2013, regressions are executed with explanatory variables 
likely to affect the magnitude of the dowry. The data consists of 96 weddings conducted 
within the last 5 years in Rajapura village in Bangalore District.   
 
So far there is no consensus among researchers on which variables that are significant for 
determining the magnitude of the dowry. The few research that have been conducted differ in 
their results and also according to which variables included in their regressions. None of them 
includes the bride’s income as possible explanatory variable, thus this is the first attempt to 
discern the significance of that variable.  
 
How the bride’s education and income impact the dowry, will affect how parents invest in 
their daughters. Should the bride’s education be significantly positive for the dowry, 
households need to choose between continuing to educate their daughters or save for their 
dowries. But on the other hand, if the bride’s education has negative effect, families will have 
incentives to continue to educate their daughters since that lowers the magnitude of the 
dowry.  
 
The same reasoning is applicable for the bride’s income, however there is no reason to 
assume that this variable should have positive effect on the magnitude of the dowry, theory 
rather suggests a purely negative effect. Brides with income should, in any marriage market 
with rational actors, be more valuable since they can contribute to the household assets. And 
if so, her own family have incentives to send their daughters to work, possibly at the cost of 
education depending on which effect education has on the possibilities to acquire a job.  
 
The marriage market is hypothesized to produce assortative matches, where high-quality 
grooms marry high-quality brides and vice versa, which previous researches have confirmed 
(Rao, 1993, Andersson 2007). To what extent the bride’s traits are correlated to the groom’s is 
of interest since that will affect how parents invest in their daughters. One should also 
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consider whether the marriage market is defined by groom or bride specific characteristics. If 
it is groom-specific the bride’s characteristics will have no effect on the dowry and vice versa. 
However, in line with previous results there is reason to believe that the marriage market is 
neither purely groom nor bride specific, but rather a mix of the two (Dalmia, 2004), which 
this thesis considers.  
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2. The Dowry System 
 
2.1 Marriage Payments 
Even though the marriage market is different around the world, Anderson (2007) notes that 
the tradition of marriage payments is or has been a part of most societies at some period of 
time. Marriage payments mostly occur in societies where marriages are arranged by the 
parents of the respective spouses. The payments differ in magnitude and the direction 
transferred in. Bride price, common in Africa, is transferred from the groom’s household to 
the bride’s, while dowry is when the payment is transferred along with the bride from their 
natal families to the groom’s family (Dickemann, 1991).  
 
The value of the bride price is usually low, whereas the dowry often exceeds the annual 
income of the household, leading to impoverishment for some families. Micro data from India 
reveal that the value of the transferred assets sometimes even exceeds six times the annual 
income of the household. Since the payments are of such a magnitude it has effect on coming 
generations and disturbs the savings patterns. (Anderson, 2003 & 2007, Rao 1993, Srinivas, 
1984, Srininvas & Lee, 2004)  
 
2.2 Dotal1 Societies  
 
The societal structure determines which form of marriage payments that are likely to occur. 
Primitive, tribal, nomadic societies with polygamy mainly have the tradition of bride-price. 
Dotal societies are usually socioeconomically complex and socially stratified, with 
endogamous2 and monogamous marriage practices. Daughters leave their natal home after 
marriage while sons stay and divorce is prohibited and thus also unusual. (Anderson 2003, 
2007, Botticini et. al., 2003)  
 
In dotal societies women and their children are often dependent on the economic support of 
men and the women’s role in agriculture limited (Boserup, 1970, Gaulin et al, 1990). In 
socially stratified societies, where men reap the benefits of modernization prior to women, 
dowry payments emerge due to quality differentiation amongst grooms. Thus dowry 
payments might decrease if the women’s value in the marriage market increase, for instance if 
                                                
1 Societies practicing dowry payment 
2 Men and women from families with equal status marry 
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women begin to benefit from modernization. (Anderson, 2003 & 2007) Thereby indicating 
that brides with income should pay lower dowries. 
 
2.3 Dotal India 
2.3.1 Marriages 
According to the description of a typical dotal society, one can predict the presence of dowry 
in India. Dommaraju’s (2009) data reveal that 95% of all marriages in India were arranged in 
the beginning of 2000, indicating that arranged marriages are the norm. Marital dissolution 
remains rare, and Hindu ideology views marriage as an essential ritual, which all men and 
women must undergo, in particular women (Dommaraju, 2009, Srinivas, 1984). Brides 
become members of their husband’s kin group after marriage and are expected to consider the 
interests of their new kin. Another important aspect is that children inherit status from their 
fathers and caste is in an important indicator of status (Srinivas, 1984).  
 
Dowry is a major part in marriage negotiations and is settled on the individual level prior to 
the wedding. The age at marriage have increased but still remains low among certain social 
groups, fortunately women’s education has also improved substantially (Dommaraju, 2009).  
 
Andersson (2007) claims that beauty is the most important quality of brides in India, while for 
grooms it is the ability to earn a living, often reflected in his educational level.  
2.3.2. History of Dowry 
After introducing The Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961, the dowry system should have 
disappeared or at least decreased. Reality reveals the opposite development, that is, the dowry 
system has spread to new classes, castes and societies in India to such an extent that we can 
call it universal. Originally dowry payments were a tradition of the high castes, but like most 
other high caste traditions, the lower castes have copied, a phenomenon known as 
Sanskritization (Srinivas, 1984, Srinivas, 2005, Anderson, 2007).  
 
Gold, mainly made into jewelleries, have become the most important part of the dowry in 
India and thereby is commonly referred to as pavun (gold) (Srinivas, 2005). The bride is the 
main recipient of the jewelleries, however it is ambiguous whether the bride gains control of 
them after marriage. Gifts will also be given from the groom family to the bride (Srinivas, 
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1984), but since the bride is moving in the same direction one could claim that the groom 
family are gifting themselves.  
 
In India the inherent caste hierarchy remains rigid, 9 out of 10 weddings are conducted with 
spouses of the same castes as their natal families (Dommaraju, 2009). Dickemann (1991) 
claim that dowry marriages are tools to secure or create bonds between dominant kin groups.  
 
India has a long tradition of hypergamic marriages, brides marrying grooms of higher status 
within the same caste, which is assumed to be a strategy for the bride’s kin to improve their 
status (Srinivas, 1984, Srinivas & Lee, 2005). However hypergamy used to occur mostly in 
North India, whereas South India is more known for cross-cousin marriages, defined within 
the term isogamy. 
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3. Theory  
3.1 The Marriage Market 
The marriage market resembles most other markets, were rational actor search for the partner 
who will maximize their utility. Each actor is assumed to gain greater utility from being 
married to one person than remaining single (Cigno, 1991). It is assumed that utility can be 
transferred and that the market reveals full information. The marriage market is full of 
potential brides and grooms of different traits and characteristics, which make them more or 
less popular in the market. The marriage market will decide who marries whom, which in its 
turn depends on the preferences of each actor.  
 
Srinivas (2005) suggests that marriages are conducted on the basis of creating alliances 
among families and groups to ensure the protection and perpetuation of property, group 
identity and social status.  
 
Brides and grooms are assumed to have preferences for partners with similar characteristics as 
themselves, thus an effective marriage market is expected to cause assortative matching. 
Furthermore, economists expect an efficient marriage market to reach Pareto efficiency, a 
state when no one can be better of by remaining single or choosing another partner without 
making someone else worse off (Anderson 2007, Becker 1981, Rao 1993).  
 
3.2 Marriage Payments 
Becker’s (1981) theory suggests that due to inflexibilities in the division of household 
commodities, a more powerful or rich individual in the marriage might ask for compensation. 
Therefore, when two individuals entering into one household have unequal power or 
unequally contribute to the household assets, marriage payments are likely to arise. Dowry 
payments will occur when the bride’s share of the household income is above her shadow 
price in the marriage market. Thus dowry can simply be thought of as an economic 
transaction to compensate for the fact that women produce less into the household (Anderson, 
2007). 
3.2.1 Dowry 
Dowry is primarily a transfer from the bride’s natal family to the bride, groom or groom’s 
family at the time of marriage. As mentioned before the dowry and bride move in the same 
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direction (Srinivas, 2005). Dalmia (2004) maintains that the combination of the bride’s, the 
groom’s and their households’ characteristics will determine the price of the match in the 
market, thereby concluding that the dowry is the price of a good match. 
 
3.3 Matching 
3.3.1 Groom and/or Bride Specific 
 
Whether the marriage market is groom or bride specific affect how the dowry is determined. 
If the market is purely groom-specific, the grooms can demand dowry from the bride he 
chooses regardless of her characteristics (Lahiri & Self, 2007). As a rational actor, the groom 
will choose the bride willing to pay the highest dowry. If, on the other hand the market is 
purely bride-specific, brides with higher quality can pay lower dowries (or perhaps even get a 
bride-price), regardless of the groom characteristics. However, there is a possible third 
situation, a mix of the two. In such a market both the groom and bride qualities will be valued 
and thus determinants of the amount of the dowry. Thereby implying that both spouses can 
use their traits to increase or decrease the dowry. Throughout the thesis I will consider the 
possibility of a mixed marriage market. 
 
3.3.2 Assortative Matching 
Assortative matching indicates that individuals are not randomly matched in the marriage 
market but rather there are mechanisms that match individuals of similar characteristics, i.e. 
married couples are assumed to be more similar to any two other random individuals. An 
efficient marriage market is expected to exhibit positive assortative mating, where high-
quality grooms are matched with high-quality brides and low-quality grooms are matched 
with low-quality brides. This outcome occurs when grooms and brides are complementary 
inputs into production and the efficient market maximizes aggregate output, so that no person 
can improve their marriages without making others worse off (pareto efficiency) (Becker, 
1981).  
3.3.3 Male Hypergamy 
In stratified societies male hypergamy is common, the custom of marrying grooms from 
superior class, within the same jati3. Women should wed superior males since children inherit 
                                                
3 Includes the thousands of clans, tribes, communities and sub-communities in India 
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their father’s status and therefore hypergamy in the other direction is forbidden since it would 
cause a lowering of status (Anderson, 2003). When male hypergamy occurs this causes 
asymmetry between the affinal groups, giving more power to the groom kin, who then can 
demand dowry (Srinivas, 1984).  
 
In a society where male hypergamy is desirable, the dowry becomes a tool for competition. 
Families with daughters will try to move up the social ladder by matching their daughters with 
grooms from high status families, thereby the desire to marry grooms of a higher caste 
(Srinivas, 2005). However male hypergamy is only possible if the bridal families of a certain 
class are capable of paying higher dowries than brides of a higher class.  
 
3.4 Determinants of The Dowry 
An actor in the marriage market will be more or less popular depending on the traits the 
individual has acquired. High-quality grooms are expected to be able to demand higher 
dowries and high-quality brides to pay lower dowries. Which traits that are determinant of 
quality is ambiguous however high education and income are most likely significant (Cigno, 
1991). 
 
Since most marriages in a dotal marriage market are arranged, the characteristics of the 
spouses’ households are also hypothesized to be significant. Schlegel (1993) claims that 
fathers compete for son-in-laws and young men for the best dowry they can get.  
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4. Previous Research 
 
India’s long tradition of dowry makes popular for studies on the subject. A few studies on the 
determinants of the magnitude of the dowry have previously been conducted and is thereby of 
interest for this thesis, however all differ from mine in some important aspect. None of the 
research includes the bride’s nor groom’s income as explanatory variables. Three previous 
studies, Rao (1993), Dalmia (2004) and Sharma & Frijters (2009), execute Oridinary Least 
Squares (OLS) -regression with dowry as their dependent variable, but with different 
explanatory variables. A summary of their regression results can be found in table 1 at the end 
of this section.  
 
Sharma & Frijters (2009) studied the relationship between female dowry and her level of 
human capital endowment, which in many ways resembles this thesis. Their data include 
information of 110, which are collected from a general survey on dowry related issues from 
2004. The households are located in Patna, Bihar in North India and were selected on a 
systematic random sampling basis. Questions were asked about the households’ expected 
behaviour, which might be a problem for their research since expected behaviour and actual 
behaviour is likely to differ. Furthermore they also exclude variables which previous research 
has shown to be significant, such as the groom’s characteristics. Sharma & Frijters (2009) 
control for selectivity and endogenity biases and still get the same results.  
 
Dalmia (2004) attempted to explain dowry exchange and groom selection in India. Dalmia 
used data from a household survey conducted in 1995, which initially was used for a study 
titled ‘Poverty, Gender Inequality and Reproductive Choice’. The 1037 households are 
located in Uttar Pradesh in North India or Karnataka in South India. Dalmia’s assumptions are 
based on Rosen’s implicit market model.  
 
Rao (1993) conducted his regressions to prove dowry inflation with data from 240 households 
residing in six different villages from three different districts of rural South Central India.  
 
Purkayastha (2006) used a theoretical approach to show that reciprocal behaviour within a 
household is the main driver of dowry, which is determined in the larger market of perfectly 
competitive assortative marriages. Purkayastha (2006) assumed that the two households must 
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provide signals to assess and disclose private information about the future partners and 
concludes that the amount for equilibrium dowry is determined by the market forces.  
 
4.1 Assortative Matching 
 
Empirical findings support assumption of positive assortative matching for spouses with 
respect to age and schooling (Dalmia & Lawrence 2001, Rao 1993, Behrman et al, 1995). Rao 
(1993) also found support for correlation between the spouses height and landholdings. 
However Dalmia & Lawrence (2001) found mixed and weak indications for assortative 
mating with respect to height and parental wealth. Behrman’s et al (1995) research indicated 
that the bride’s age at marriage increase with the groom’s education. 
 
Srinivas (2005) and Andersson (2003) highlighted the importance of compatibility for wealth, 
and assumed this to be a key consideration for marriage matching. Anderson (2003) also 
claimed perfect assortative matching for caste, suggesting endogamy rather than hypergamy.  
 
Dalmia & Lawrence (2001) found evidence that dowry increases the likelihood of women 
marrying men with characteristics dissimilar to their own. In other words, dotal marriage 
markets tend to cause less assortative matching than markets without dowry-payments.  
 
4.2 Male Hypergamy 
Indian marriages are traditionally status male hypergamous (Srinivas & Lee, 2004), which 
Rao (1993) confirmed by his results, which showed that grooms are older, more educated and 
taller than their brides. Botticini (2003), who also studied the Indian marriage market, implied 
an increased demand for socioeconomically more successful husbands.  
 
The size of the dowry seems to be affected by hypergamy, indicated by the difference in the 
amount of land owned by the parents of the respective spouses before marriage (Rao, 1993) 
and the fact that grooms from higher socio-economic strata demand higher dowries (Dalmia, 
2004).  
4.3 Determinants of The Dowry 
Theory suggests that characteristics of the prospective brides, grooms and their households 
will be determinant for a match and also the amount of the dowry, something most scholars 
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agree on. However, previous research indicates dissimilar results. Dalmia’s (2004) research 
showed that the age, schooling and height of the groom are valued traits in the marriage 
market, along with the status of the groom’s household. This could indicate that those traits 
will also have significant effect on the dowry. 
 
Anderson (2007), Sharma & Frijters (2009) and Dalmia (2004) found the bride’s education to 
have significant, positive effect on the amount of the dowry, which indicate that another year 
of schooling for the bride increases the amount of the dowry. Anderson (2007) found the 
groom’s education to be significantly positive for the amount of the dowry, while Berhman et 
al. (1995) did not find any significant relationship. Dalmia (2004) indicated the existence of 
separate marriage markets for uneducated and educated brides in India. The data I use include 
less than two uneducated brides and few with less than 7 years education, therefore I have not 
applied the same reasoning. 
 
Rao (1993) found none of the individual traits of the bride or groom such as schooling, age 
and height to have significant effect, perhaps explained by the fact that Indian marriages are 
predominantly arranged by the families of the bride and groom (Dalmia & Lawrence, 2001) 
and is much more an alliance between families than between a husband and a wife. Therefore 
the characteristics of parents are also important, sometimes maybe more important than the 
characteristics of the spouses themselves (Behrman, et al., 1995).  
 
Andersson (2003) claimed that the brides and their families compete for high-status/high-
quality grooms by offering higher dowries, and the wealth of the bridal family determine how 
how much dowry they pay. Thus richer families afford to pay higher dowries, indicating that 
wealth/income should be a determinant of the magnitude of the dowry. Anderson (2007) 
found that the dowry increase with the wealth and social status of both the bride and groom 
households. Rao (1993) found that the difference in land owned by the parents of each spouse 
before the marriage significantly reduces net dowries. 
 
The dowry and the caste system are highly connected and therefore dowry cannot be 
understood without reference to the caste system (Srinivas, 1984). Rao (1993) and Anderson 
(2007) found that higher casts pay the highest dowries.  
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Purkayastha (2006) also note that the bride´s beauty might be significant, however none has 
included this as a variable probably because of the difficulty to measure beauty.  
 
  Dalmia Sharma Rao 
Bride’s education (+)/s (+)/s   
Bride’s age (+)/n     
Groom’s age (+)/s     
Groom’s education (+)/s     
Bride’s Height (+)/n     
Groom’s Height (+)/s     
Bride’s Landholdings (-)/n     
Groom’s Landholdings (-)/n     
Caste (+)/s   (+)/n 
Year of marriage (-)/s     
Bride’s father’s age   (+)/s   
Bride’s household income   (+)/s   
Bride’s fathers education   (-)/s   
Bride’s mothers education   (-)/s   
Bride’s brothers average education   (-)/s   
Bride’s sisters   (-)/n   
Bride’s brothers   (-)/s   
Bride’s brothers dowry   (+)/s   
Difference in landholdings     (-)/s 
Difference in education     (-)/n 
Difference in height     (-)/n 
Difference in age     (+)/n 
(+) = positive, (-) =negative, (s) =significant, (n) = not significant, (empty) = not included 
Table 1, a summary of the regression results made by Rao (1993), Dalmia (2004) and Sharma and Frijters (2009) 
4.4 Groom and Bride Specific 
Lahiri & Self (2007) considered two different situations, one where a more educated groom 
demand a higher dowry regardless of the educational level of the bride, referred to as groom-
specific. In the other situation the bride’s educational level helps to lower dowry payment, 
regardless of the education of the groom, referred to as bride-specific. Lahiri & Self (2007) 
conclude that under groom-specific dowry, when the amount of dowry only depends on the 
groom’s characteristics, it increases the level of discrimination against women. Under bride-
specific dowry, there is still discrimination if and only if the skill premium in the labour 
market is larger than that in the marriage market.  
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5. Methodology and Data 
5.1 Method 
Rao (1993), Dalmia (2004) and Sharma & Frijters (2009) conducted Ordinary Least Squares-
regressions with dowry as the dependent variable, and this thesis uses the same method. Their 
research use a variety of explanatory variables, all three include the bride’s education but 
neither of them the bride’s income. Rao (1993) is mainly interested in proving dowry inflation 
and Dalmia (2004) in discerning the demand for groom characteristics. Thus this research 
mostly resembles Sharma and Frijters study, which attempts to discern the relationship 
between dowry and female education, however, as mentioned before, their variables are based 
on the expected behaviour of the household and not on the actual behaviour and they do not 
include any of the groom’s characteristics, which previous result has shown to be explanatory. 
One could thereby expect their regression to suffer from omitted variable bias. 
 
In line with previous research I conducted OLS-regressions, my dependent variable in 
equation (1) is net dowry, and since the net dowry is composed by the gifts of the groom and 
bride kin, I also regressed equation (2) with the gifts from the bride and equation (3) gifts 
from the groom as dependent variables. Equation (1) and (2) are of main interest and are 
similar to regressions in previous research, but it is also of value to discern how the groom 
family responds to the traits of the bride and therefore equation (3) is included. However there 
is not as much theory to support the hypothesis for that regression, but theory suggests that if 
the groom family desires brides with high education and income, we should expect them to be 
willing not only demand less gifts from the bridal family but also give more gifts.   
 
Net Dowry = α + β 1X + β2Bride’s_Education + β3*Bride’s_Income + ε (1) 
 
Bride Gifts = α + β 1X + β2Bride’s_Education + β3*Bride’s_Income + ε (2) 
 
Groom Gifts = α + β 1X + β2Bride´s_Education + β3*Bride’s_Income + ε (3) 
 
This thesis mainly focuses on the significance of the bride’s education and income but all 
other relevant characteristics of the bride, groom and their household are included in vector X. 
The variables are chosen because they have shown significance in previous research or are 
hypothesised to be significant according to theory. A list of the variables included will follow 
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along with a description of them. The equations are linear and all three include an identical set 
of variables. To remedy the regressions from heteroskedacitet I used White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
5.2 Data 
The regressions are based on data I collected in and around the Rajapura village in May 2013. 
To my help I had a translator originally from Bangalore city, who asked the questions. We 
used a pre-settled form with questions, which is included in the appendix. We interviewed the 
elders in the household, mainly the fathers of the bride or groom. 
 
Rajapura is an agricultural society with one dominant caste (Okkaliga) and one high caste 
(Lingyat). Two thirds of the citizens belong to the dominant caste, while the other castes are 
represented in fewer numbers. Rajapura is located 7 km from Magadi town belonging to 
Bangalore Distric, Karnataka State of South India. Data was collected through interviews with 
either the bride’s or groom’s household, of totally 101 weddings. Five of the weddings were 
conducted by Muslims and are thereby excluded4, however the three love-marriages5 are 
included. Thus the data consists of 96 weddings, which is enough to be able to draw 
conclusions, however a larger sample might give more strength to the results and perhaps 
even show different results.  
 
All weddings were conducted within the last 5 years (2008-2013) and at least one of the 
spouses belongs to Rajapura. The reason for choosing marriages within the last 5 years is to 
avoid misleading results because of time factors, such as the fact that families educate their 
children longer today than they did in previous decades and families tend to have fewer 
children. There are many changes in the society that might distort the result if marriages 
conducted long ago are included and it is also more likely to remember details from marriages 
conducted recently. 
 
Since dowry is prohibited in India (since 1961) there is reason to believe that people will not 
be completely honest if asked about dowry given or received, therefore we instead asked 
which gifts were transferred between the two kin-groups in connection with the wedding. The 
                                                
4 Muslims have the tradition on polygamy and are thereby more likely to pay bride-price 
5 Marriages that are not arranged by the spouses parents, but by the spouses themselves 
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value of the gifts, which mainly consisted of gold, has been calculated according to the prices 
of 2013 and are presented in Indian Rupees.  
 
To get some insight in which amounts were transferred and the characteristics of the two kin 
groups, table 2 show descriptive statistics. The statistics reveal that the bridal family generally 
spend 180 000 Rupees more than the groom family, that the bride is on average seven years 
younger than her husband and her natal family generally has 0,6 children less. More 
comments on the statistics will follow in the results. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Bride’s Gifts  259705.5  375826.5  0.0  3372302. 
Groom’s Gifts  80561.2  113971.5  0.0  778223.5 
Net Dowry  178909.8  371443.9 -638000.0  3247786.0 
Bride’s Income  1309.0  3199.7  0.0  22500.0 
Groom’s Income  7909.7  6967.8  0.  45000.0 
Bride’s Father’s income  3493.5  7175.8  0.0  41666.7 
Groom’s Father’s income  3102.4  6139.9  0.0  33333.3 
Bride’s Age  20.6  2.5  15.0  27.0 
Groom’s Age  27.9  2.8  20.0  37.0 
Bride nr of children  2.8  1.1  1.0  6.0 
Groom nr of children  3.4  1.5  1.0  11.0 
Bride nr of Daughters  2.0  0.9  1.0  5.0 
Groom nr of Daughters  1.3  1.4  0.0  8.0 
Bride’s Education  11.6  2.8  0.0  17.0 
Groom’s Education   10.7  3.3  0.0  17.0 
Bride’s Father’s Edu.  4.9  4.9  0.0  17.0 
Groom’s Father’s Edu.   3.4  4.2  0.0  15.0 
Bride’s Landholdings  3.1  4.6  0.0  30.0 
Groom’s Landholdings  3.5  4.0  0.0  20.0 
Bride’s Waitingtime  3.0  3.0 -3.000000  13.0 
Groom’s Waitingtime  11.2  4.1  2.0  24.0 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
5.3 Variable Descriptions 
5.3.1 Dependent Variable(s) 
Net dowry is the dependent variable in regression (1), calculated through subtracting gifts 
given by the groom’s household from gifts given by the bride’s household. As expected, the 
net dowry was almost unexceptionally positive. The regression is executed to discern which 
traits that have significant effect on the net dowry, in particular the effect of the bridal 
education and income. The two following regressions uses gifts from the bride and gifts from 
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the groom as dependent variables, with the same set of explanatory variables as the previous 
regression. Regression (2) is conducted to discern how the magnitude of the gifts given by the 
bridal household is affected by the traits of the bride, groom and their households. Regression 
(3) on the other hand is to discern how the combination of traits affects the amount the groom 
family spend on gifts. If the household in question value a certain trait this should be reflected 
in the significance of the variable. As far as I am concerned, regression (3) has not been 
conducted in any previous research.  
 
The household were asked about the details of the gifts transferred between the groom and 
bride households. Gold made into jewelleries, was the most common gifts. There is no record 
of who the recipient of the jewelleries are, but according to the interviews they were mainly 
given to the bride and groom. Besides that, the bridal household gave bikes, land and money 
to the groom household. To simplify the variable I calculated the value of the gold according 
to the price of gold the year of the wedding.  
5.3.2 Explanatory Variables  
Below is an extensive description of the explanatory variables included in the regressions. 
The variables mainly measure the characteristics of the bride, groom and their fathers. The 
hypothesized results on each of the regressions are described.    
5.3.2.1 Education 
Education is measured in years, starting from class one.   
Bride’s (Br_Edu) 
This variable measures the amount of years the bride have spent in school, i.e. the years the 
family has spent on investing in their daughters human capital. Theory suggests that the 
bride’s education could have positive and negative impact on net dowry. Significantly 
positive effect on net dowry indicates that highly educated brides pay higher dowries. In other 
words, if a household educates their daughter another year they have to pay a higher dowry. 
The theoretical explanation would be that the spouses’ educational levels are positively 
correlated because of assortative matching in the marriage market. Brides with higher 
education have the opportunity to marry grooms with higher education, whom can ask for 
higher dowries since they are more popular in the marriage market. This indicates that the 
value of the gifts transferred by the bridal family should increase along with the bride’s 
education, thereby indicating positive effect on regression (2) with the gifts from the bridal 
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household as dependent variable. In this case this variable could have negative effect on 
regression (3) with the gifts transferred from the groom’s household as a dependent variable, 
since we expect that more educated grooms, whom are more popular, will demand more gifts 
and give less.  
 
Another aspect is that wealthier fathers afford to educate their daughters longer and also pay 
higher dowry, therefore we need to consider correlation between the bride’s education and her 
father’s income and landholdings. 
 
But if the marriage market is defined by both groom and bride characteristics, this variable 
should have a negative effect on the net dowry. Implying that brides with higher education is 
more popular in the marriage market and therefore can use their education as “currency” in 
the marriage market to lower the dowry. Thus this variable should have a negative effect on 
the gifts from the bride and positive effect on the gifts from the groom. This would give even 
poor parents incentives to educate their daughters, opposite to what would be the case if the 
first scenario is true.  
 
Whether the variable will be positive or negative will depend on which of the powers that is 
the strongest, and if they are equally strong this variable might not be significant.  
Groom (Gr_Edu) 
This variable measures the time the groom have spent in school, which is hypothesized to 
have positive effect on the net dowry and the gifts from the bride, indicating that grooms with 
higher education can and should ask for higher dowries since education has shown to be a 
valuable trait in grooms (Anderson, 2007). Furthermore this variable should be significantly 
negative for the groom’s gifts since grooms of higher quality should not have to spend as 
much on gifts.  
Bride’s father (BrFa_Ed) 
This variable measure the years the bride’s father has spent on acquiring school education. 
Similarly to the bride’s education, theory indicates that the bride’s father’s education could be 
positive as well as negative for all three regressions. If fathers with higher education are 
considered to have higher status, they can choose higher-quality grooms for their daughters, 
thus the variable should have significant positive effect on regression (1) and (2) since higher-
quality grooms demand higher dowries. Furthermore this variable could have negative effect 
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on regression (3). But at the same time the higher status of the father should be attractive on 
the mixed marriage market, and their daughters able to pay lower dowries than those with less 
educated fathers. Then we should expect a negative effect on net dowry and gifts from the 
bride and we should expect the groom to be willing to give more gifts to capture brides with 
wealthy fathers, indicating a positive affect for this variable in regression (3). As for the 
bride’s education, the expected effect of this variable is ambiguous and depends on which 
factor is strongest.  
Groom’s father (GrFa_Ed) 
Theory suggests this variable, which measure the years the groom’s father has spent in school, 
to have the same effect on the three regressions as the variable measuring the groom’s 
education.  
5.3.2.2 Monthly Income 
Bride (Br_Inc) 
This is the second variable of major interest for the thesis, which measures the monthly 
income of the brides. Since theory suggests that marriage payments occur because of 
inflexibilities in the division of household assets, dowry is assumed to be a compensation to 
the groom for the bride’s lower income or even absence of income. Brides with their own 
income should thereby be attractive and since they are rare in the rural marriage market this 
variable should have negative effect on the net dowry as well as gifts transferred by the bridal 
household. It is also expected to have positive effect on the groom gifts because of the 
grooms’ desire to marry brides with income.   
Groom (Gr_Inc) 
The groom’s monthly income is measured by this variable. High-quality grooms are more 
popular in the marriage market, and income is hypothesized to be an indicator of quality. 
Therefore we expect groom income to have a positive effect on the net dowry and bride gifts 
and negative effect on groom gifts.   
Bride’s Father (BrFa_Inc) 
This variable measures the amount the bride’s father earns on a monthly basis. If wealth is 
associated with high status, brides with richer fathers should be more attractive in the 
marriage market. These brides can choose a groom demanding lower dowry, indicating this 
variable to be negative in regression (1) and (2) while positive in regression (3). But on the 
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other hand, richer fathers can afford higher quality grooms for their daughters and since India 
is known for hypergamy, we can expect fathers to buy the best son-in-law they can afford, 
thereby suggesting this variable to be positive in regression (1) and (2). In that case this 
variable should have negative effect in regression (3).  
Groom’s Father (GrFa_Inc) 
The groom’s father’s monthly income is suggested to be significant and is thereby measured 
in this variable. Sons inherit the family wealth, thus grooms with richer fathers should be 
more popular and this variable have positive effect on regression (1) and (2). Since grooms 
with rich fathers are popular they have no reason to give more gifts, hence this variable should 
have negative effect on regression (3).  
5.3.2.3 Landholdings 
Bride’s (Br_LaHo) 
This variable measures the number of acres that the bride’s family have in their procession. 
Since the study is conducted in an agricultural society, one can expect landholdings to be a 
valuable asset and a measurement of wealth, thereby one can apply the same reasoning as for 
the income of the bride’s father. In other words, this variable could be either positive or 
negative for the three regressions.   
Groom (Gr_LaHo) 
The groom’s household’s landholdings in measured in the number of acres by this variable. 
As mentioned before, landholdings ought to be a valuable asset in an agricultural society and 
therefore grooms with more landholdings will be more popular and hence ask for higher 
dowries. In other words, groom landholdings should have a positive effect in regression (1) 
and (2) and negative effect in regression (3).  
5.3.2.4 Caste 
The Caste-variable is a dummy variable with high and dominant castes as the reference 
category, coded as 0. The middle and lower castes are coded as 1. Because of the strong 
connection between the dowry and the caste system, this variable is naturally included. Even 
if Sanskritization has taken place, higher castes are expected to pay higher dowries since it 
originates from them. The dominant castes are also expected to pay higher dowries since they 
traditionally have had greater freedom to emulate the customs of the higher castes (Srinivas, 
1984). This variable should have negative effect on all three regressions.  
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5.3.2.5 Number of Daughters 
Bride (Br_Dau) 
This variable measures the number of daughters in the bridal household. For every daughter 
dowry must be paid at the time of marriage, therefore families with many daughters have to 
spend larger amounts all in all than those with fewer daughters. One might thereby assume 
that families with many daughters will afford to spend less money on dowry for every 
individual daughter. That indicates that this variable should have a negative effect on the bride 
gifts. It should also have negative effect on the groom gifts since brides with many sisters 
might not be as popular. Whether the net dowry will be negatively affected by this variable 
depends on the effect on gifts from the bride and gifts from the groom respectively.  
Groom (Gr_Dau) 
This variable measures the number of daughters in the groom household. India has the 
tradition of marrying their daughters first, thereafter their sons. Thus at the time of marriage 
for their sons the families have spent large amounts on dowry and weddings, and the larger 
number of daughters the family has, the more they ought to have spent. To add up to the 
money spent they might ask for higher dowries, indicating that this variable should have a 
positive effect on gifts from the bridal household. However, families with many daughters 
might not be as popular in the marriage market and therefore might not be able to ask for 
higher dowries, thereby indicating that it will have negative effect on the gifts from the bride. 
One can assume that this variable will affect the groom gifts negatively since the groom 
family will afford to spend less the more daughters they have. This indicates that this variable 
could have a negative as well as a positive effect on the net dowry. 
5.3.2.6 Isogamy   
This variable is a dummy, where marriages with closely related spouses are considered to be 
of isogamy-character and are assigned the value 1. Grooms closely related to their brides are 
expected to demand lower dowries, thereby indicating a negative effect on net dowry and gifts 
from the bride. Because of the close relationship between the spouses the groom household 
might spend more on gifts to the bride, indicating a positive effect on regression (3).  
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5.3.2.7 Bride’s Age at Time of Marriage / Bride’s Waiting-time (Br_Wai) 
This variable measure the number of years the bride waits to get married after finishing her 
studies. Rao (1993) suggests that older brides will be willing to pay higher dowries than the 
younger brides to make sure that they get married in the present marriage market, while 
younger brides have the possibility of searching for grooms in a later marriage market. Thus 
the bride’s age at marriage should be significantly positive for the dowry, however age and 
education are much likely strongly correlated which makes the effect of the bride’s age 
ambiguous. Therefore, instead of a variable measuring the bride’s age at marriage, I have 
included the time the bride waits to get married after finishing studies. The variable might 
also act as a measure of the popularity of the bride, since brides that quickly marry after 
finishing their studies ought to be more popular. According to theory this variable should be 
positive for net dowry and bride gifts while having a negative effect on the groom gifts. All 
women are more or less obliged to get married and a woman should therefore have a desire to 
get married as soon as possible after finishing her studies, unless she has her own income.  
5.3.2.8 Groom’s Age at Time of Marriage / Groom’s Waiting-time (Gr_AvWai) 
This variable differs from the bride’s waiting-time because the situation for men is different, 
therefore I have calculated the average waiting time to get married after finished studies for 
grooms, and subtracted this from the grooms actual waiting time. The reason the grooms 
situation is different is because they don´t have the pressure of getting married quickly, 
mainly since men have their own income and are assumed to inherit their families wealth. 
Furthermore, up to a certain age older men might be more popular since they are more mature 
and have had time to acquire a stable income, but when grooms are above a certain age at 
marriage that might indicate that they have had problems in getting married. Men that have 
waited longer than the average waiting time are thereby most likely less popular on the 
marriage market, and grooms that have waited less than average might be more popular. 
Theory therefore expects this variable to be negative for bride gifts and net dowry, however it 
should be positive for groom gifts since men who have problems with getting married might 
have to compensate by gifting more. There might be other explanations to why a man has 
waited longer than average.  
 
5.3.3 Not Included Variables 
Scholars who study the dowry system tend to recognize that the beauty of the bride is 
important, however neither of the previous researches have added a variable to measure this. 
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The reason it is not included in the regressions conducted in this thesis is the difficulty of 
finding an objective measurement and also the lack of to time develop such a measurement. 
Since we did not meet all the brides it was even harder to appreciate the beauty of the bride.  
 
Dalmia (2004) added height, mainly as a proxy for nutrition, and found the groom’s height to 
be significantly positive whereas the bride’s height was not. In this thesis height is not 
included because there was no record of the height of the spouses and the parents of the 
spouses did not have knowledge of their height.  
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6. Results 
6.1 Assortative Matching and Male Hypergamy 
 
Table 3 (in the appendix) show the correlation between the variables, and fortunately none of 
the variables were correlated to the extent that multicolliniaritet should be a problem. The 
correlation table indicate high assortative matching between the spouses’ education and 
between the bride’s education and groom’s income. Thus we can conclude that highly 
educated individuals are matched with each other and well-educated brides marry wealthier 
grooms.  
 
The incomes of the spouses were weakly correlated, while the correlation between the bride’s 
education and the groom’s income are much stronger. Perhaps because all the brides, except 
one, were educated while only few of them (24%) had an income. A majority of the groom 
had their own income (90%), some from working in the field but a large share of the grooms 
were occupied outside the agricultural sector.   
 
From Figure 1, showing the frequency distribution of years in school for the brides and 
grooms, we come to know that few individuals from the sample are educated less than 7 
years. Furthermore, a majority of the male individuals seem to quit school after finishing 10th 
class, while more women than men tend to continue studying beyond 10th class. It is also 
worth noting that the brides on average have 0,9 years more in school, as can be seen in table 
2. The data might be misleading since the women generally are 7 years younger than their 
husbands and school attendance have increased over the years. Data also show indications of 
positive but weak correlation between the spouses age, as opposed to Dalmia & Lawrence 
(2001) who found this variable to be the strongest indicator for mating of spouses. 
 
The bride’s income and education is correlated, however not as strongly as the correlation 
between the groom’s education and income, which is in line with previous research. Men in 
dotal societies often have the possibility of gaining from modernization before women do, 
indicating that even if women educate themselves longer they might not have the possibility 
of getting a job outside the agricultural sector.  
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Figure 1: Frequency of years in school divided by brides and grooms 
 
There is a negative correlation between the bride’s caste and education, indicating that higher 
and dominant castes educate their daughters longer, which is understandable since they are 
predicted to be wealthier. Out of the 96 weddings included in the data, none of them were 
cross-caste, i.e. the data show perfect assortative mating for castes. Indicating that caste is an 
important factor in Indian marriages and that cross-caste marriages might be prohibited in this 
village. However caste did not have significant effect on the net dowry, bride gifts nor groom 
gifts.  
 
The income of the spouses’ fathers and landholdings were positive but weakly correlated. The 
groom households owned 0,3 acres more than the bridal household on average, which 
confirms male hypergamy. However the bride’s fathers generally earned 400 Rupees more 
and were on average 1,5 years more educated than the father of the groom, i.e. the opposite of 
male hypergamy. Since daughters are usually married first and are on average 7 years younger 
than their grooms, one can assume that the fathers of grooms will be older than fathers of 
daughters. And since the educational level has increased over the years, we would actually 
predict that fathers born more recently would have higher education. If this is not the case, we 
have found data pointing in the opposite direction of male hypergamy.  
Data also show that the groom family on average have 0,6 more children than the bridal 
family. To conclude, data show weak evidence of male hypergamy for the weddings 
conducted in Rajapura. The brides themselves are even more educated then their grooms, 
which as mentioned could be explained by the age difference. The only area in which the 
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grooms excel is earning income. Grooms earn on average 7000 Rupees more than their brides. 
This would indicate that the dowry is a form of compensation for inflexibilities in income 
distribution.  
 
6.2. The Magnitude of The Dowry 
The net dowry is on average high, but varies allot between the weddings as Table 2 indicate. 
The bride household spend 260 000 Rupees on average, which account for six times the 
annual income of their fathers. While the groom household spend allot less on gifts, it is still 
two times the annual income of the groom’s father’s income or almost a years annual income 
of the groom. Thus we can conclude that the amounts transferred are huge and have direct 
impact on the household economy. More than 90% of the households reported that they 
borrowed money to finance the dowry, and many of them are still under debt. One should also 
note that the bridal family on average have two daughters, thereby they totally have to spend 
12 times the annual income of the father’s income. 
6.3 Determinants of The Dowry 
The results from the regressions are summarized in table 4. Several other regressions with 
different combinations of explanatory variables have been conducted, but regardless the 
combination of variables the basic results remains the same, i.e. the results are robust. 
Regressions with the bride’s and groom’s age at marriage were also conducted but neither of 
the variables were significant.  
 
As hypothesized the bride’s income has negative effect on the net dowry and gifts from the 
bridal household, and is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The bride’s income 
does not have significant effect on the gifts given by the groom household. However based on 
regression (1) and (2) we can conclude that brides with income are more popular on the 
Indian marriage market and can negotiate the dowry. The fact that the income is significant 
for net dowry and bride gifts support the thought of dowry being a compensation for the 
women’s lower contribution to the household income. Brides with their own income pay 
lower dowries due to the fact that they will participate in contributing to the household 
income. Thus making sure that women get their own income is an important step in removing 
the dowry system and thereby the unwantedness of daughters. The result also confirms that 
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dowry payments are rare in developed countries due to a more equal status and opportunities 
for women and men than in developing countries, such as India.  
 
Unfortunately the results from the regressions indicate that the bride’s education does not 
have significant effect on the magnitude of the dowry. It has a negative effect on the bride 
gifts and the groom gifts but since the t-statistics is low we cannot reject the null-hypothesis 
that the variable is insignificant. What we do know is that the bride’s education is positively 
correlated with the income of the groom, indicating that highly educated brides are popular in 
the marriage market and thereby marry wealthier men.  
 
Furthermore the groom’s income is positive and statistically significant for the net dowry at 
the 10 per cent level and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for the gifts from the 
bride and gifts from the groom. Thus we can conclude that income is an important indicator of 
quality, so that men with higher income demand higher dowries however they also spend 
more on gifts to the bride. And once again the assumption of dowry being a compensation for 
the difference in contribution to the household income is confirmed. Since both the bride’s 
and the groom’s income have significance we can conclude that the Indian marriage market is 
a mix of bride and groom specific.  
 
However we also need to note the positive significance on the groom gifts, which is most 
likely because richer grooms afford to give more gifts to their brides. The gifts to the brides 
will belong to the groom household, and the bride will wear the jewelleries which could be 
used a signal to others of the wealth of the groom family. The groom household also tend to 
give more gifts when the groom is more educated, probably explained by the fact the groom 
education and groom income is highly correlated. 
 
The groom father’s income is strangely significantly negative at the 10 per cent level. The 
regressions with groom and bride gifts as dependent variables might explain why, since this 
variable is negative for bride gifts and positive for groom gifts, not significantly though. The 
reason might be that richer fathers might not have the financial need of asking for high 
dowries but since they are richer they afford to give more gifts. Another possible explanation 
could be correlation with an omitted variable.  
 
 
 32 
Table 4: Results equation 1, 2 and 3 
 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
  Net Dowry Bride Gifts Groom Gifts 
 
Bride’s Education -1965.528 -8276.819 -6594.112  
  (25916.98) (23474.47) (5744.033) 
Groom’s Education 7359.691 16104.92 8990.514* 
  (13781.95) (13164.98) (4633.012) 
Bride’s Father’s Education -1583.730 -670.0752 816.5548 
  (6611.216) (6135.471) (1588.296) 
Groom’s Father’s Education 3981.372 2781.643 -1115.080 
  (9750.894) (9084.326) (2478.946) 
Bride’s Income -29.52384** -24.08770** 5.522941 
  (14.13152) (10.86964) (6.28615) 
Groom’s Income 34.30894* 38.56464** 4.238973** 
  (19.10332) (18.30093) (1.687882) 
Bride’s Father’s Income -6.271754 -3.731414 2.614980 
  (6.242495) (5.950168) (1.690948) 
Groom’s Father’s Income -18.30425* -12.22474 6.089059 
  (9.933586) (9.256119) (5.311496) 
Bride’s Landholdings 8046.420 8158.355 155.0692 
  (5899.976) (5550.151) (1534.476) 
Groom’s Landholdings 630.2534 2731.145 2003.305 
  (9075.450) (8449.378) (4173.179) 
Caste  -16760.86 -30486.55 -13760.92 
  (56327.42) (56357.12) (17335.75) 
Bride, Nr of Daughters -19586.35 -5195.744 14422.14 
  (25531.21) (24073.35) (9671.196) 
Groom, Nr of Daughters -1621.210 -6579.879 -4664.076 
  (31566.11) (31988.59) (4949.612) 
Isogamy  -102018.0 -37457.24 65238.30*** 
  (68112.17) (66934.79) (21238.73) 
Bride’s waiting time -13549.78 -15828.85 -2350.947 
  (19582.51) (17776.02) (4186.772) 
Groom’s waiting time -248.7844 3465.503 3859.863 
  (11397.48) (10662.92) (2836.155) 
Constant  42179.17 -35.39507 -42027.68 
  (249228.1) (244501.3) (54848.85) 
Observations  96 96 96 
 
R-squared  0.481504 0.542658 0.581584 
 
Adjusted R^2   0.376492 0.450031 0.496842 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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Isogamy, measured in how closely related the spouses are, show significant, positive effect on 
groom gifts. Indicating that the groom family give more gifts when they have a close 
relationship with the bride family. However isogamy has no significant effect on gifts from 
the bridal family or net dowry.  
 
None of the other variables are significant in neither of the regressions, thus few of the 
variables showed any significance, which could be a consequence of the small sample but it 
could also be that it is only these variables that have any effect. It could also be an effect of 
the fact that there are different powers a play, such as assortative mating and hypergamy.  
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7. Discussion  
The results clearly indicate that dowry payment emerge due to the women’s lower status and 
lower incomes in the Indian society. The fact that the bride’s income has significant, negative 
effect on the dowry indicate that if men and women would have equal incomes the dowry 
payments would rapidly decrease and eventually disappear. Thus one of the main focuses for 
improving the women’s situation should be to increase their opportunities in being employed.  
 
I was positively surprised by the high levels of education the brides showed to have, however 
it is disappointing that even though the brides on average are more educated then the grooms 
in the sample, only 24% of the brides have their own income. Indicating that even if women 
are more educated they still have less opportunities in getting a paid job. 
 
More of the groom characteristics, such as the groom’s education and the groom’s father’s 
income, showed to have significant effect, thus we might assume that the marriage market 
might be a bit more groom specific than bride specific.  
 
The results clearly show that the households, specifically the bridal household, spend huge 
amounts on dowry. Since families on average have at least one daughter we expect a majority 
of the families to struggle with dowry payments. For another thesis it would be interesting to 
investigate how the households would have spent the money, if they didn´t have to spend it on 
dowry, i.e. what affects would it have on the Indian society if the tradition of dowry 
disappeared? How would the disappearance of dowry affect women in India? News regularly 
report crimes due to fights about dowry payments, which mainly hurts the bride.  
 
I suppose it is not a surprise that a majority of the households had to borrow money to finance 
the dowry, however it is disappointing to know that so many households are or have been 
under debt because of the dowry system. In this situation we should consider the bridal 
father’s on average earn less than 500 SEK per month.  
 
  
 35 
8. Conclusion 
The dowry system has great impact in India on families with daughters, first of all because it 
causes families to want sons rather than daughters and second of all it disturbs the household 
economy and their savings patterns. Data, which I collected from rural South India, show that 
the bridal family on average spend six times the annual income of the father6. The magnitude 
of the dowry forces families to borrow, thus more than 90% of the interviewed households 
admitted to borrowing a large share of the dowry and declared to still be under debt.  
 
The amount of the dowry is negotiated between the spouse’s families and are hypothesized to 
be determined according to the traits of the bride, groom and their households. There is no 
consensus among scholars about which characteristics that are significant. This thesis aims at 
discerning whether the bride’s income and education have significant effect on the magnitude 
of the dowry. In line with previous research I conducted OLS-regressions, using the data I 
collected from the 96 weddings. Three different regressions were conducted, with the net 
dowry, the gifts from the bride and the gifts from the groom as dependent variables. The 
bridal education and income were the explanatory variables of most importance, however 
several other variables that capture the characteristics of the bride, groom and their 
households were included. 
 
The results showed that bridal income has significant, positive effect on net dowry and gifts 
from the bride, which indicate that brides with income are popular on the marriage market and 
can thereby negotiate the magnitude of the dowry. The negative effect of the bride’s income 
on the net dowry confirms that the dowry is a form of compensation for the difference in 
contribution to the household assets. Since her income is significant for the dowry we can 
assume that the marriage market is a mix between bride and groom specific, i.e. both spouses 
determine the net dowry. However this variable have no significance on the gifts given by the 
groom household. 
 
Furthermore, the bride’s education has no significance in either of the regressions, concluding 
that the brides can not negotiate the dowry based on their educational level. However the data 
show that the spouses education are positively correlated, and the groom’s income is strongly 
correlated with the bride’s education, indicating that brides with higher education marry richer 
                                                
6 The father is the only individual with an income in many rural households  
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and better educated grooms. The bride’s where on average 0,9 years more educated than their 
husbands, something that can be explained by the fact that grooms are generally seven years 
older than their wives and since education has increased over time we would expect younger 
individuals to be more educated. The data on correlation confirm assortative matching in the 
Indian marriage market but does not confirm male hypergamy.  
 
The groom’s income was significantly positive in all three regressions. Isogamy and the 
groom’s education had significant effect on the gifts from the groom and the groom’s father’s 
income had significant negative effect on the net dowry. None of the other included variables 
showed any significance.  
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Appendix 1: Correlation Table 
 
Table 3: Correlation between variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Interview Questions  
 Br_Dau GrDau Br_Ed Gr_Ed BrFa_Ed GrFa_Ed BrFa_Inc GrFa_Inc Br_LaHo Gr_LaHo Br_Inc BrWai Gr_Wai Gr_Inc Br_Age Gr_Age 
Br_Dau 1 0.12 -0.16 -0.15 0.16 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.13 -0.07 0.14 0.09 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 
Gr_Dau 0.12 1 -0.16 -0.1 -0.04 -0.25 -0.2 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.17 -0.11 
Br_Ed -0.16 -0.16 1 0.60 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.21 -0.01 0.27 0.35 -0.62 -0.36 0.56 0.36 0.18 
Gr_Ed -0.15 -0.10 0.60 1 0.27 0.42 0.2 0.32 -0.02 0.32 0.28 -0.26 -0.74 0.51 0.35 0.08 
BrFa_Ed 0.16 -0.04 0.28 0.27 1 0.28 0.5 0.32 0.13 0.39 0.21 -0.14 -0.2 0.18 0.14 0.01 
GrFa_Ed 0.08 -0.25 0.38 0.42 0.28 1 0.23 0.45 -0.01 0.41 0.33 -0.12 -0.28 0.44 0.28 0.08 
BrFa_Inc -0.03 -0.2 0.38 0.2 0.5 0.23 1 0.28 0.16 0.27 0.37 -0.19 -0.14 0.35 0.19 0.03 
GrFa_Inc 0.02 -0.09 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.45 0.28 1 0.16 0.62 0.35 -0.13 -0.2 0.36 0.09 0.08 
Br_LaHo 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.16 0.16 1 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.13 
Gr_LaHo 0.13 -0.01 0.27 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.27 0.62 0.29 1 0.27 -0.15 -0.14 0.24 0.11 0.17 
Br_Inc -0.07 -0.15 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.04 0.27 1 -0.1 -0.29 0.29 0.26 -0.10 
BRWAI 0.14 0.01 -0.62 -0.26 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 -0.1 1 0.28 -0.29 0.50 0.11 
GRWAI 0.09 0.01 -0.36 -0.74 -0.2 -0.28 -0.14 -0.2 0.1 -0.14 -0.29 0.28 1 -0.34 -0.06 0.61 
Gr_Inc -0.19 -0.12 0.56 0.51 0.18 0.44 0.35 0.36 0.03 0.24 0.29 -0.29 -0.33 1 0.27 0.10 
Br_Age -0.01 -0.17 0.36 
 
0.36 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.26 0.50 
 
-0.06 0.27 1 0.33 
Gr_Age -0.04 -0.11 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.17 -0.10 0.11 0.61 0.10 0.33 1 
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